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1  Introduction  
The frequency and power of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks have marked the first quarter 
of 2013 as the worst quarter for DoS attacks in history (Prolexic, 2013). Leveraging botnets 
and high-speed network technologies, modern DoS attacks exceed the scale of 100 Gbps 
becoming a major threat on the internet (Prolexic, 2013). Being one of the oldest type of 
attacks, DoS attacks are known for their disruptiveness and ability to deplete the computing 
resources and/or bandwidth of their victims in a matter of minutes. In spite of being trivial 
in execution, they are easily detectable mostly due to their dynamic and voluminous attack 
rates. As a result, the recent years have seen a growing trend towards more sophisticated 
application-layer DoS attacks.  
As opposed to traditional DoS attacks, application layer DoS attacks are perceived as 
stealthy, sophisticated and undetectable at the network layer (Xie and Yu, 2009). Focusing 
on specific characteristics and vulnerabilities of application layer protocols, application 
layer DoS attacks are capable of inflicting the same level of impact as traditional flooding 
DoS attacks at a much lower cost.  
With the latest escalation of application-layer DoS attacks, the research community has 
focused its attention on defence and mitigation techniques for this type of attacks. Since 
effective defences require a comprehensive understanding of the existing application-layer 
DoS attacks, several existing studies in the field attempted to provide some classification 
of these attacks.  
As such, one of the first attempts to classify application-layer DoS attacks was 
conducted by Ranjan et al. (2006). Analysing exploitable workload parameters, the authors 
categorised the existing attacks into three classes; request flooding attacks that employ high 
rates of requests to deplete server’s resources; asymmetric attacks that focus on high 
workload requests; and repeated one-shot attacks that spread workload across multiple 
sessions and initiate sessions at high rates.  
This classification was later adjusted by Yu et al. (2007) to distinguish session flooding 
attacks, request flooding attacks, and asymmetric attacks, eliminating the category of 
repeated one-shot attacks. Furthermore, a study by Xuan et al. (2010) confirmed a necessity 
to differentiate between high-rate attacks and high-workload attacks.  
From the industry perspective the application-layer DoS attacks were divided into four 
categories: request-flooding attacks, asymmetric attacks, repeated one-shot attacks and 
application-exploit attacks (Arbor Networks, 2012). This classification, although does not 
provide necessary depth, unifies the views expressed in the academic studies mentioned 
above.  
Several other studies attempted to narrow the classification of various types of 
application-layer attacks. Focusing specifically on web applications, Cambiaso et al. (2012) 
developed a taxonomy of slow application-layer DoS attacks. Zargar et al. (2013) looked 
at the flooding-based application-layer DoS attacks, offering a very broad classification 
into two categories: reflection/amplification-based flooding attacks and HTTP flooding 
attacks. The latter category also included non-volumetric attacks, such as the slow-read and 
slow-send HTTP attacks that are generally executed with strategically sent requests.  
There were a number of surveys giving introduction into traditional DoS attacks and 
their defences (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004; Beitollahi and Deconinck, 2012; Peng et al., 
2007). Although providing a good analysis of network layer DoS attacks challenges, these 
            
  
            
  





studies do not give the depth necessary for comprehensive understanding of application-
layer DoS attacks and consequently for the development of practical defence mechanisms.  
In this paper, we address this problem and develop a taxonomy of application-layer 
DoS attacks. Along with this taxonomy we consider representative examples of various 
attack categories and outline characteristics of attacks.  
The comprehensive understanding of the existing application-layer DoS attacks, 
supported by a unified terminology, is a necessary foundation for the advanced 
development and deployment of reliable and efficient defence mechanisms against this type 




Variability of studies and close industry attention to the field have quickly revealed the 
gap in terminology and understanding of these attacks. Although the majority of the 
existing studies in the field attempt to provide some classification, they often contradict 
each other in defining various attack types, resorting to inconsistent terminology or simply 
vague description of any given attack. For example, a study of application-layer DoS 
attacks by Durcekova et al. (2012) referred to a type of a slow-rate attack as the Slowloris 
attack1. Yu et al. (2007) explored attack defences and divided application-layer DoS attacks 
into session flooding, request flooding, and asymmetric attacks, while Ranjan et al. (2009) 
referred to the same attack types as repeated-on-shot, request flooding and asymmetric 
attacks.  
Our contributions in this work are two-fold:  
• To give researchers a better understanding of the application-layer DoS attacks and 
defences. This taxonomy provides a comprehensive overview of the existing 
application-layer DoS attacks. For each category, we provide its definition, 
distinctive features and representative examples derived from both industry and 
academia.  
• To provide a foundation for organising research efforts in the field of  application-
layer DoS attacks.  
To the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive and systematic classification of 
application-layer DoS attacks does not exist. The goal of this paper is to provide a 
complete taxonomy of the existing application-layer DoS attacks accompanied by 
representative examples. This paper is the first attempt to organise existing research 
efforts in this area that, as we hope, will be extended by other researchers in the 
future.  
Figure 1  (a) DoS attacks over the past years (b) The DoS attacks spectrum (see online version  for 
colours)  
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This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a general background of the 
application-layer DoS attacks. Section 3 proposes a taxonomy and defines the adopted 
criteria for the classification of the application-layer DoS attacks. In Section 4, we discuss 
examples of the most well-known application-layer DoS attacks in relation to the proposed 
taxonomy. Finally, Section 5 concludes the work and outlines avenues for future research.  
2  The application-layer DoS attacks  
With a focus on resource exhaustion, DoS attacks spawn a broad spectrum of variants 
capable of depleting resources at any layer of the traditional TCP/IP architecture.  Figure 1 
gives examples of DoS attacks traditionally seen at various layers of the TCP/IP 
architecture.  
Historically, DoS attacks were consistently present among internet threats. These 
attacks targeting network and transport layers were prevalent on networks mostly due to 
their effectiveness and simplicity in execution. However, with the fast development of 
network infrastructures, simple attacks became less effective. Although flooding is still a 
viable disruption method, modern DoS attacks rarely need to exceed the throughput 
capacity of the network as the target often fails long before the capacity is reached.  
This gave a boost to development of application layer DoS attacks, that became one of 
the rapidly growing categories, representing more than 20% of all attacks in 2013 (Prolexic, 
2013). The growth of application layer DoS attack incidents throughout the years are 
presented in Figure 1.  
This new category of attacks specifically targets the application-layer and affects user 
applications without affecting network resources. There are several unique characteristics 
that let application-layer DoS attacks stand out among the traditional DoS attacks:  
• Limited resources consumption: Traditionally, network-based DoS attacks are the 
flooding attacks requiring a large amount of resources (e.g., compromised ‘zombie’ 
devices, bandwidth) to be able to exceed network capacity at the target site. With the 
focus on higher levels, the need for resources on the attacker side has been 
diminished significantly, due to the limited capacity at the targeted applications. This 
opened a new possibility of executing severe DoS attacks with the use of automated 
scripts at a single machine. For example, slow-send attacks can be mounted by 
transmitting legitimate HTTP POST requests at a slow pace, occupying the resources 
            
  
            
  





and preventing other clients from completing their connections. This type of attacks 
can be effective even with the presence of a single attacker (Gonzalez et al., 2014).  
• Targeted damage: The shift to the application-layer necessitates a strategic selection 
of a specific target (e.g., service, application) on a system. This leads to a 
concentrated damage incurred to that single target leaving the rest of the unrelated 




• Stealthiness: This characteristic of application layer attacks was repeatedly 
emphasised in security domain (Xie and Yu, 2009; Tang, 2012; Beitollahi and 
Deconinck, 2014). The intelligent execution of the application-layer DoS attacks 
makes malicious traffic practically indistinguishable from the traffic generated by 
legitimate users. This comes mostly from the fact that the anomalous nature of the 
application-layer network traffic is invisible at the lower levels due to  
1 the necessity to piggyback on legitimate connections (e.g., HTTP slow-read 
attack requires an established TCP connection)  
2 the focus of the attacks (i.e., targeted damage) that requires the attacker to use 
available resources strategically, often exploiting legitimate features of 
application-layer protocols.  
This situation is aggravated by the lack of appropriate defences that allows these 
attacks to fly under the radar of traditional intrusion detection systems, most of which 
are deployed at the network level. Modern application-layer attacks often 
masquerade as human behaviour [e.g., through the use of headless browsers that 
mimic legitimate browser behaviour (Bains, 2014)] which allows them to blend with 
normal network traffic even more.  
In spite of this, there were several studies that questioned the effectiveness of certain 
types of application-layer DoS attacks (Gonzalez et al., 2014).  
3  Taxonomy of application-layer DoS attacks  
The diversity of application-layer DoS attacks calls for their detailed analysis. The critical 
step in characterising and understanding this variability is the definition of a set of essential 
parameters (i.e., features) that will provide a comprehensive classification of the currently 
existing attacks. We build on the existing body of knowledge about network layer DoS 
attacks, and in this work we only focus on discriminative features that appear at the higher 
levels.  
To devise this classification, we consider a set of features that describe the general steps 
of an attack, namely, system exploitation; the attack execution; and its effect on the targeted 
system. Thus, we extract the following features characterising exploitation stage: attack 
target level and exploitation type; describing execution: attack methodology type, attack 
traffic volume, and attack requests’ workload; and finally its effect on a victim: affected 
services.  
These features will help researchers to navigate through the diversity of  application-
layer DoS attacks and as such form a foundation of the proposed taxonomy (see Figure 2).  
  
            
  
            
  






Figure 2  Taxonomy of application-layer DoS attacks  
  
3.1 Attack target level  
Although implemented at the application-layer, DoS attacks can either target specific 
application protocol features or focus on components exposed at the user interface level 
(e.g., a search component in a content management system) and accessible through 
application layer. From this perspective, the attacks are divided into end-user application 
level attacks and protocol level attacks.  
• End-user application level attacks: target weaknesses of applications running on the 
victim’s system (e.g., web servers, database servers) in order to deplete its resources. 
The main premise of this category of attacks is the necessity to expose certain 
functions through application platforms enabling legitimate access to underlying 
systems. As a result, a legitimate functionality or a vulnerability is leveraged to 
access underlying and otherwise hidden servers. For example, a common attack 
against retail websites is to put a few thousand items in the shopping cart, continually 
adding items and refreshing the cart. The necessity to validate each of the requests 
would stall the underlying database server (Securosis, 2013).  
  
  
This category also includes attacks exploiting application business processes, often 
referred to as business logic flaws. Customised for each application, business 
processes are unique which makes their automated detection challenging if not 
            
  
            
  





impossible. Exposing business logic flaws requires a deep understanding of the 
application and its business processes, often leading to specialised time-consuming 
manual testing. The examples of such exploits include the flooding of online polls, an 
increasingly large number of simultaneous bidders in online auctions, etc. Finally, 
end-user application level attacks are highly specific and damaging.  
• Protocol level attacks: Specifically aim to exploit flaws of the protocols’ 
implementation or legitimate features of the protocols’ functionality. Among the 
most common targeted application-layer protocols are HTTP, FTP, DNS, VoIP and 
SMTP (Arbor Networks, 2012).  
3.2 Exploitation type  
Although the exploitation of an application’s vulnerabilities is still a major concern, the 
focus of DoS attacks in the recent years has shifted towards an abuse of legitimate 
application features and functionality. We differentiate between vulnerability-based 
attacks and feature-based attacks.  
• Vulnerability-based attacks: Exploit the flaw or a bug in the system design, 
implementation or configuration in order to exhaust the system’s resources. The 
number of annually discovered vulnerabilities has been steadily increasing over the 
years. An example of the vulnerability-based attacks is the Apache Range Header 
attack. This is a web server specific attack where a malicious HTTP request 
indicating a very large overlapping range is sent to the web server, resulting in 
memory exhaustion and server crash. Nowadays, this attack is no longer effective 
since a released patch mitigates this flaw by checking the received request at the 
server side. When the byte range parameter is included in the received request, the 
sum of all ranges is calculated. In the case where the sum is larger than the requested 
file, the request is ignored and the entire file content is sent (Apache, 2011; 
Cambiaso et al., 2012).  
The DoS attacks executed with the use of malformed requests/messages are also 
considered under this category. In general, the malformed messages often aim to 
gain system control, and thus they are not typically considered as DoS attack 
methods. However, there is a class of malformed requests that subvert the targeted 
system resulting in its collapse and effectively the denial of service for the legitimate 
users. Theoretically, any request not adhering to the developer’s expectations might 
lead to incorrect system behaviour and potentially, a DoS attack. Examples of these 
attacks seen in practice include malformed SNMP requests (Symantec, 2010; 
CISCO, 2002) and malformed XML data (IBM, 2013a, 2013b).  
• Feature-based attacks: As opposed to vulnerability-based attacks that exploit 
system’s defects, feature-based attacks abuse legitimate functionality of applications 
and protocols. Since the exploited functionality is intended, there are two common 
ways to perform this type of attacks: through flooding to overwhelm the allocated 
resources (e.g., by sending large number of requests), and through intelligent   
one-shot execution that occupies system resources with a large workload. Many of 
the end-user application level attacks fall in this category. For example, allowing a 
user to enter a complex query requiring a significant processing power or occupying 
a large chunk of memory ties up the server resources which slows down its overall 
performance for the legitimate users. Another example is the Snowflake search 
attack (i.e., a query that requests to compare a large set of values against a variable 
that never matches) (Securosis, 2013).  
            
  
            
  




3.3 Attack methodology type  
The origin of an application-layer DoS attack defines its methodology type during its 
execution. Based on the origin of the attack traffic, we differentiate between direct attacks 
and reflection attacks. Although not consistently, this category has been seen as a part of 
traditional DoS attacks classification (Beitollahi and Deconinck, 2012). The primary 
difference for application layer  
• Direct attacks: Require the attack traffic to be sent directly from a true attacking 
source towards the targeted victim. These are generally attacks that rely on an 
established and legitimate connection. For example, the HTTP protocol-based 
attacks (e.g., HTTP POST/GET) fall into this category.  
• Reflection attacks: Are executed through intermediate reflectors (i.e., legitimate 
devices that unknowingly participate in an attack by redirecting/reflecting the 
traffic to the primary target). The classic example of reflection DoS is the DNS 
reflection attack (also referred to as DNS amplification attack). Taking advantages 
of the nature of the DNS protocol that permits queries from forged IP addresses, 
the attack generates DNS queries that require a large response that can be 
effectively redirected to the victim consuming its resources. DNS reflection attack 
was the largest source of traffic in the notorious Spamhaus attack, labelled as the 
largest DDoS attack in 2013 (Prince, 2013).  
The execution of a reflection attack provides two main advantages to the attacker:  
• the ability to hide the true source of the attack traffic and increase the difficulty in 
the identification of the attack  
• amplify the attack traffic making it even more potent.  
As a result, reflection attacks often have a devastating effect on the victim site.  
3.4 Attack traffic volume  
Irrespective of how an application-layer DoS attack is being executed, any attack involves 
a certain amount of malicious traffic to the victim. Based on the volume of the sent traffic, 
we differentiate high-volume attacks and low-volume attacks.  
• High-volume attacks: Also known as flooding attacks, transmit high volumes of 
application-layer requests (e.g., HTTP GETs, DNS queries, SIP INVITEs) to the 
victim in an attempt to deplete its resources. Being one of the classic attack methods 
associated with DoS attacks, flooding attacks, first seen in 1989 (Defence.net, 2013), 
have been flourished into a diverse spectrum of attacks. Traditional flooding attacks 
have been focused on depleting network bandwidth, however with the rapidly  
increasing capacities of modern network infrastructures, such direction became less 
effective and more resource intensive for the attackers. The situation also revealed 
the vulnerability of the local targets, proving that server’s resources is a primary 
bottleneck in this type of attacks. Thus, application-layer flooding attacks intend to 
deplete server’s resources at the application level (e.g., CPU resources through  high-
computation queries, memory pool through a large number of requests). SMTP 
flooding attack comprises a representative example of the application-layer flooding 
attacks. In this attack, the objective is to overwhelm the targeted SMTP server by 
sending to it a high volume of e-mails. When the SMTP server is under attack and 
the incoming traffic load exceeds a specific threshold, then its performance is 
affected resulting in delayed e-mail delivery or even complete system crash 
(Bencsáth and Rónai, 2007).  
            
  
            
  





• Low-volume attacks: In contrast to flooding attacks, these attacks are not required to 
send a high volume of attack traffic. The low-volume attacks are generally executed 
with small amounts of attack flows transmitted strategically to degrade the victim’s 
performance. There are two variations of low-volume DoS attacks: those that require 
a stream of attack flows in order to achieve the attack goal, and those that can be 
executed with a single shot (i.e., a connection, a network packet).  
The first variation of low-volume attacks includes the so called low-rate and 
slowrate application-layer DoS attacks. Low-rate attacks are based on the realisation 
that high volumes of traffic are visible and highly suspicious. Thus sending attack 
traffic by periodic short-time pulses, the attacker significantly reduces the possibility 
of detection. Generally, low-rate attacks are characterised by a specific traffic pattern 
formed by the attack requests strategically sent to the victim. Rather than 
overwhelming target’s resources, low-rate attacks aim to occupy all the allocated 
spots (e.g., in a service queue). Therefore, the attacker’s success is often dependent 
on his ability to predict the appropriate point in time when the positions in the 
service queue become available in order to fill them before any legitimate request 
arrives. The timing of these positions can be generally predicted (to various degree 
of accuracy) through analysis of victim’s behaviour and the use of fixed temporal 
patterns.  
Overall, low-rate attacks offer two main advantages to the attacker. On the one hand, 
the attack’s behaviour effectively causes denial of service with minimal resources on 
the attacker’s side. On the other hand, the intelligent execution allows the attack to 
remain undetectable, flying under the radar of the traditional network-layer-based 
intrusion detection systems.  
Similarly to low-rate attacks, slow-rate attacks exhaust server’s resources causing a 
denial of service without sending an overabundance of network packets. An attack 
generally exploits one of the common properties of the application-layer protocols to 
reserve resources until after a completion of a connection. In this context, slow-rate 
attacks target specific applications with a single computer, leaving the rest of 
unrelated services intact.  
Although the effectiveness of both low-rate and slow-rate attacks has come under 
question (Gonzalez et al., 2014), their detection remains challenging.  
One-shot attacks are powerful attacks that are able to inflict damage to the victim with 
a single connection, one request, or one network flow. These attacks generally exploit 
a specific weakness in order to consume excess amounts of the victim’s resources. Both 
Snowflake search attack (Securosis, 2013) and Apache Range Header attack 
(SpiderLabs, 2011) are good examples of this type of attacks. Similarly to the other 
types of low-volume attacks, one shot attacks are almost undetectable and require 
customised mitigation mechanisms.  
3.5 Attack requests’ workload  
Depending on the workload of the requests, application-layer DoS attacks are divided into 
symmetric attacks and asymmetric attacks.  
• Symmetric attacks: Include all types of the application-layer DoS attacks sending 
requests that do not generate high volume of work for the targeted server.  
• Asymmetric attacks: Leverage normal rates of high workload malicious requests. 
These requests are specifically designed to consume a significant amount of the 
victim server’s resources. The main objective of the asymmetric attacks is to 
            
  
            
  




generate a large amount of work for the victim in order to consume a significant 
portion of its resources, with a single malicious request. Thus, in asymmetric attacks, 
a high rate volume of attack traffic is not required in order server resources depletion 
and normal service operations disruption to be achieved. This makes the detection of 
asymmetric attacks more difficult compared to the symmetric attacks. Additionally, 
the asymmetric attacks cause more damage per request than symmetric attacks 
(Arbor Networks, 2012; Zargar et al., 2013).  
3.6 Affected services  
Depending on the services simultaneously impacted by the application-layer DoS attacks, 
we differentiate between targeted attacks and dispersed attacks.  
• Targeted attacks: target a specific service leaving the rest of unrelated services intact. 
An example of such attack is the Slow HTTP POST attack that transmits to the 
victim server incomplete HTTP requests causing the victim server to reserve 
resources for open connections waiting for their completion.  
• Dispersed attacks: also target a particular service while affecting other services 
(perhaps inadvertently) at the same time. We can differentiate two variations of 
dispersed attacks: those that affect other services at the same layer, and those attacks 
that affect other services beyond one layer.  
Most of the DNS attacks also fall under the second category. Due to the nature of the DNS 
service, specifically attacking DNS flaws, of even one server, has an immediate and 
damaging impact on the ability of the legitimate clients to access other unrelated servers 
(e.g., database server, web server).  
The major challenge with this type of attacks is the difficulty in predicting the overall 
impact. While many of these attacks are relatively simple in detection, they are difficult to 
defend against.  
  
            
  
            
  






Table 1 A summary of common application-layer DoS attacks    
  
            
  
            
  







4  Examples of application-layer DoS attacks  
In this section, we discuss examples of the most well-known application-layer DoS attacks 
in relation to the proposed taxonomy. A summary of the presented attacks is given in Table 
1.  
Table 1   A summary of common application-layer DoS attacks (continued)  
            
  
            
  





4.1 End-user application level attacks  
End-user application level attacks (e.g., SQL injection) have been seen in the past. 
However, with the shift to web-based services, the end-user application level DoS attacks 
became more common. There have been seen a variety of end-user application level attacks 
mostly focused on web applications. One of the legacy attacks from this domain is a brute 
force attack on the application login page that aims to guess the login credentials. Among 
other attacks that have been recently seen are the HashDoS attack, the XDoS attack and the 
ReDoS attack.  
HashDoS attack is a powerful asymmetric attack operating at the end-user application 
level. It has a large impact on the CPU performance of the victim server, by sending a low 
volume of carefully chosen small request messages. The attack exploits vulnerable hash 
functions used in hash table implementations of many programming languages (e.g., PHP, 
ASP.NET, Python, and Java) for web applications.  
In web applications, hash tables are data structures that programmers prefer for data 
storage, since they store key-value pairs very efficiently. However, hash tables are not 
efficient in the worst-case, where all of the keys are assigned by the hash function to the 
same hash value, causing hash collisions. This happens when hash tables make use of weak 
hash functions and this is the vulnerability that attackers exploit in order to degrade the 
CPU performance of the targeted web servers (Crosby and Wallach, 2003).  
Firstly, the attacker creates web application forms’ variable names with the same hash 
values. Then the attacker sends, in low bandwidth rate, POST requests including many of 
the colliding variable names. As a result, the hash table on the web server side is 
overwhelmed and the web server’s CPU spends all its time managing the collisions, which 
is a computationally intensive task (Cambiaso et al., 2012; Falkenberg et al., 2013). 
According to the attack methodology type, HashDoS attack is a direct attack sending 
directly the POST requests to the targeted victim.  
Similar to HashDoS attack, XDoS attack targets servers hosting web services. This is a 
relatively new attack that exploits the XML language structure and the Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) to deplete server’s resources making them unavailable to the legitimate 
users. There are known several variations of the XDoS attack:  
• XML flooding attack is one of the straightforward implementations of the XDoS 
attack. Although it is a truly application-layer DoS attack, it is often excluded from 
the XDoS category, mainly due to the lack of stealthiness and simplicity in 
execution.  
• Oversized XML payload attack involves transmitting an excessively large payload to 
consume the targeted server’s resources. Originally designed as compact 
communication format, XML messages are often processed in a buffered mode (i.e., 
the whole message resides in a buffer after it is received). This presents a significant 
challenge for the provided service if a large payload is received by the server. This 
situation is often aggravated by the lack of a maximum limit on the size of the XML 
message that essentially opens up the server to a DoS attack. There have been two 
variations of this attack: single XML message and multiple XML message attacks, 
aiming to take down the targeted server with a single and multiple messages 
respectively.  
• XML entity expansion (XEE) attack also known as XML Bomb or a Billion laughs 
attack. This attack exploits the XML message structure defined with a document type 
definition (DTD). Crafting a DTD with a large number of nested entities can lead to 
explosive growth of data when XML message is parsed. There were reported several 
            
  
            
  




variations of the XEE attack, namely, the Quadratic Blowup attack (Sullivan, 2009) 
and the Attribute Blowup attack (The Web Application Security Consortium, 2000).  
• External entity reference attack exploits the XML parser property to resolve 
references to external resources (e.g., external URIs) during parsing and bring the 
requested content. This opens up a wide window for attacks. An XDoS attack can be 
triggered by simply specifying non-existent resources, causing parser to remain in an 
infinite loop. Compared to the XEE attack that occupies CPU resources, external 
entity reference attack only consumes a single thread of execution which has a 
limited impact on server’s performance. A slight improvement in damage can be 
generated by opening multiple connections requesting to download media content 
(Ye, 2008).  
Although only certain types of the XDoS attack has been seen in the wild (e.g., XML 
bomb), the potential danger of the XDoS attacks in general has been repeatedly emphasised 
(Padmanabhuni et al., 2006; Jensen et al., 2007; Ye, 2008; Chonka et al., 2009; Karthigeyan 
et al., 2012). Overall, the XDoS attacks are asymmetric attacks since only a small portion 
of the processing power of the attacker’s machine is required in order to send an attack 
payload to the victim.  
Also asymmetric in nature are the ReDoS attacks that make use of regular expressions 
(regexes) with specific patterns. Regular expression matching is a ubiquitous technique 
often used for input validation in web applications. The vulnerability of regexes lies in the 
wide adoption of backtracking algorithms [rather than the traditional deterministic finite 
automaton (DFA) contraction] in regular expression matchers employed in modern 
programming languages. As a result, crafting a malicious regex will result in the matcher 
taking exponentially long time to process an expression and essentially failing to terminate, 
causing a DoS attack. This attack was initially presented by Crosby and Wallach (2003) 
and has received a significant research attention since more vulnerabilities of regex 
matchers were discovered (Cambiaso et al., 2012; Kirrage et al., 2013).  
4.2 Protocol level attacks  
In spite of the variety of end-user application level attacks that are conceivable, only a 
handful of application-layer protocols are commonly attacked. Among them are HTTP, 
DNS, and SMTP protocols. However, with the emergence of voice over IP (VoIP), DoS 
attacks based on SIP protocol are quickly becoming one of the major threats.  
4.2.1 HTTP-based attacks  
High-volume attacks: HTTP GET/POST flooding attack is perhaps the most well-known 
flooding application-layer DoS attack operating at the protocol level. Usually, it is a DDoS 
attack executed with multiple distributed attacking entities. Its main objective is to 
overwhelm the victim server with a high volume of valid HTTP requests leading to the 
depletion of its resources. The most common form of this type of attack uses GET requests 
but also POST requests can be used as well. Since the generated HTTP requests by the 
attacker have legitimate HTTP payloads and are sent via normal TCP connections, the 
targeted server is not able to distinguish them from the benign HTTP requests. Hence, the 
targeted server’s resources are exhausted, since it has to handle all the received HTTP 
requests as benign requests resulting to completely crash of the targeted server. Thus, HTTP 
GET/POST flooding attack is categorised into the disruptive attacks. However, due to the 
fact that the malicious traffic is transmitted at a constant and high rate, the attack can be 
easily detectable, especially, in the case when it follows the one-to-one execution type. 
However, for the distributed HTTP GET/POST flooding attacks that follow the many-to-
one execution type, the detection and mitigation are two challenging issues.  
There are two variations of the HTTP GET/POST flooding attack: the single-session  
HTTP GET/POST flooding and the multiple HTTP GET/POST flooding attacks.   
            
  
            
  





Single-session attack exploits a legitimate functionality of the HTTP protocol to render the 
victim server unresponsive by consuming its resources. Specifically, this attack abuses the 
feature of HTTP 1.1 to allow multiple requests within a single HTTP session. Thus, the 
attacker achieves to deplete the server’s resources with low traffic volume. The session rate 
of the single-session HTTP GET/POST flooding attack is limited compared to the session 
rate in the HTTP GET/POST flooding attack. This has as a result the attack to bypass 
detection mechanisms based on the session rate despite the disruptive impact on the victim 
server’s side (Zargar et al., 2013).  
Multiple HTTP GET/POST flooding attack, on the other hand, achieves its objectives 
by generating high volumes of workload for the victim server and consuming its resources 
with low attack traffic volume. For this reason, this attack serves as a representative 
example of the asymmetric application-layer DoS attacks. The attack is executed by 
creating multiple HTTP requests and integrating them into a single packet instead of 
transmitting them one after another during a single HTTP session. As a result, the attack 
causes a total disruption of the provided service to legitimate users or it brings the server 
completely down (Zargar et al., 2013; Ranjan et al., 2009; Arbor Networks, 2012; Das et 
al., 2011).  
Low-volume attacks: LoRDAS attack was proposed by Macia-Fernandez et al. (2008, 
2006) and is an example of a low-rate application-layer DoS attack. This is a specific  low-
rate attack targeting the persistent HTTP servers by transmitting attack traffic by periodic 
short time pulses at strategically chosen time instants. The existence of a temporal 
deterministic behaviour in these servers comprises a vulnerability that allows an attacker to 
predict the instants at which there are available positions in their service queues and, 
consequently, to lunch the LoRDAS attack. The case of the persistent HTTP servers can be 
extended to any concurrent server.  
  
Figure 3  A process of predicting available positions in the queue of an HTTP server  
  
The proposed process for predicting the instant Toutput at which there is an available position 
in the service queue of the targeted HTTP server is illustrated in Figure 3. The attack instant, 
Tattack, which is the same as the Toutput, is calculated by the following formula:  
 
Tattack =Tresp −RTT T+ out  
            
  
            
  




The persistent connection timeout Tout can be easily determined with just a few tests by the 
attacker. In addition, the attacker can record the instant of the HTTP response  
 
reception Tresp. Finally, RTT is the mean value of the round trip time between the attacker 
and the server.  
The synchronisation of the arrivals of the attack messages to the targeted server has to 
address two issues. Firstly, the predicted instant of an available position varies with respect 
to the real instant of an available position occurred in the server, since the real instant 
depends on the service time, which is a random variable. Secondly, the variance of the RTT 
between an attacker and a server also affects the synchronisation. Thus, in order to address 
the effect of these variations, an attacker sends a small burst of traffic including more than 
one attack packet and attempting to synchronise their arrival to the server around the 
predicted instant.  
Finally, the intelligent execution of the LoRDAS attack reduces the possibilities of 
detection from traditional network-layer-based intrusion detection mechanisms as well as 
enables the attacker to degrade the targeted server’s performance with minimal resources. 
Thus, the LoRDAS attack can be implemented successfully by following the one-to-one 
and the one-to-many attack execution types.  
  
4.2.1.1 Slow HTTP sent attack  
This attack comprises an example of slow-rate attacks. Its objective is to tie up server 
resources by slowly sending legitimate incomplete HTTP requests causing the victim server 
to reserve resources for open connections waiting for their completion. Any complete 
HTTP request ends with a line identified as \r \ n, followed by an empty line denoting the 
end of the request. The server waits the end of the request for a specific timeout before 
closing the connection. The timeout restarts when the server receives some data from the 
client. Thus, in the Slow HTTP Sent attack, the attacker never sends the final line in order 
to keep the connection open as long as possible. In addition, the attacker keeps the 
connection idle by slowly sending small amount of data to the targeted server and waiting 
a specific amount of time before the next sending. This amount of time has to be selected 
properly in order to prevent the connection release (Cambiaso  et al., 2012). Similar to the 
LoRDAS attack, the Slow HTTP Sent attack can be implemented successfully by the one-
to-one attack execution type as well as the  one-to-many attack execution type.  
Slowloris tool (RSnake, 2009) implements a variation of the Slow HTTP Sent attack 
by repeatedly sending a specific string ‘X – a: b\ r \ n’. Some other tools, such as RUDY 
(Raz, 2010) and OWASP HTTP POST (Brenann, 2010) implement another variation of the 
Slow HTTP Sent attack – the Slow HTTP POST attack, in which HTTP payload is sent to 
the targeted server at a slow pace (e.g., 1 byte/min). Essentially, any website including 
forms accepting HTTP POST requests (e.g., uploading attachment, submitting feedback) is 
susceptible to this method of attack (Chee and Brennan, 2010).  
4.2.1.2 Slow HTTP read attack  
Another example of slow-rate attacks is the Slow HTTP Read attack that works by reading 
slowly the response instead of sending slowly the request. This attack starts with a 
legitimate HTTP request from the attacker to the victim server followed by a slow 
consumption of the HTTP response sent by the victim. The Slow HTTP Read attack 
achieves its objective by setting a smaller receive window-size than the send buffer of the 
victim server (Shekyan, 2012).  
            
  
            
  





4.1.2.3 DNS-based attacks  
Similar to the HTTP protocol, DNS protocol is one of the commonly targeted network 
protocols. Due to the ubiquitous nature of the DNS protocol, its disruption generally 
propagates beyond a single target to external services.  
DNS flooding attack is an example of flooding application-layer DoS attacks operating 
at the protocol level and transmitting high volumes of DNS queries to the victim DNS 
server in order to deplete its resources. In more details, valid but spoofed DNS request 
packets, from a very large pool of source IP, are sent to the victim DNS server at a high 
rate. Due to the fact that the content of spoofed DNS request packets is designed to mimic 
actual DNS requests, the DNS server is not able to differentiate between malicious and 
legitimate packets and thus responds to all incoming requests. In its simple implementation, 
the attack causes the server to be overwhelmed by the requests leading to total disruption 
of the DNS service. A more advanced execution of the attack employs asymmetric nature 
of the requests requiring a DNS server to contact multiple servers to resolve the domain. In 
this case, the victim server is overwhelmed by attacker’s requests and the responses 
received from other DNS servers. The most advanced form of this attack employed requests 
to resolve non-existent domains.  
Despite the high volume of the malicious traffic that the DNS flooding attacks generate, 
they are difficult to detect mostly due to inability of the server to differentiate between 
malicious and benign requests.  
Depending on the type of attack methodology, DNS flooding can be a direct attack with 
a primary victim being a DNS server or a reflection attack (also known as DNS 
amplification attack) with DNS servers being used as amplifiers by sending their responses 
to the target.  
4.1.2.4 SIP-based attacks  
The popularity of VoIP services coupled with the openness of its infrastructure to the 
internet triggered a wave of SIP-based attacks, most of which were DoS attacks. Such 
situation is mostly explained by the inherit difficulty of detection and mitigation of  SIP-
based DoS attacks in the context of simplicity of an attack execution. There are several 
variations of SIP-based DoS attacks (Ormazabal et al., 2008; Rafique et al., 2009):  
• SIP flooding: SIP is vulnerable to a wide range of flooding attacks due to its open 
nature and the lack of robust security mechanisms (Hussain et al., 2013; Tang et al., 
2012). On the application-layer, signalling floods are the most prominent. Signalling 
floods are distinguished by the large number of SIP INVITE or REGISTER 
messages sent to the targeted SIP proxy server, essentially causing excessive 
processing consuming the server’s resources and as a result delaying or completely 
rejecting legitimate requests.  
Among these attacks, SIP INVITE flood is one of the most devastating attacks 
targeting SIP. In this attack, the caller (i.e., attacker) generates INVITE requests at a 
high rate in order to exhaust the resources of the SIP proxy server and the callee, 
since both of them are vulnerable to this flooding attack. According to the SIP 
protocol, the SIP proxy server must keep connection with the caller, from whom it 
received the INVITE request, at least for some time. This is the vulnerability of the 
SIP protocol that the caller (i.e., attacker) exploits by sending many new INVITE 
requests, without waiting for further signalling, in order to exhaust the resources of 
both the SIP proxy server and the callee.  
• SIP malformed message attack: SIP is also vulnerable to malformed non-standard 
SIP packets aiming to overflow the string buffers. The attack is asymmetric in nature 
            
  
            
  




and as a result, it causes the server to reach an undefined state leading to call 
processing delays, and a complete denial of service. An example of such attack 
called Invite of Death was introduced by Rafique et al. (2009).  
4.1.2.5 SSL-based attacks  
With an overwhelming migration of web services to SSL protocol in an effort to improve 
security, SSL attacks are becoming more and more popular. SSL-based DoS attack exploits 
a computationally expensive SSL handshake that puts more resource intensive operations 
on the server than on the client. Due to this expensive nature, cryptographic parameters 
once established during original SSL handshake are not required during the following SSL 
renegotiation request initiated by a client side. As a result, there are two variations of SSL 
Renegotiation DoS attack:  
• Traffic injection: the lack of cryptographic binding in SSL/TLS Renegotiation allows 
the attacker to inject malicious traffic in the server-client communication generating 
additional work for the server. Since SSL/TLS handshake requires much more 
processing power (i.e., 10 times to 35 times) on the server than on the client, this 
extra workload ties up the server’s CPU resources causing the server to be 
unaccessible by legitimate clients. Pushdo botnet is known to generate this type of 
attack.  
• SSL Flooding attack: on the other hand, employs a different strategy. Since the client 
is allowed to send renegotiation request at any time, the attacker can send multiple 
renegotiation requests per second in order to exhaust the targeted server’s resources. 
SSL Renegotiation attack is a very effective DoS attack. Although it can be executed 
in Many-to-One mode to amplify the damage, the One-to-One attack execution type 
is sufficient to fully exhaust the server’s resources and not allow any other legitimate 
client to establish a connection (TLS/SSL Renegotiation DOS, 2011).  
5  Conclusions and future work  
This paper presents a taxonomy of the existing application-layer DoS attacks accompanied 
with representative examples, derived from both industry and academia, in order to provide 
a foundation for organising research efforts in the field of  application-layer DoS attacks. 
The incentive behind this effort has been the necessity  for a comprehensive understanding 
of the existing application-layer DoS attacks, supported by a unified terminology, that will 
enable the advanced deployment of  reliable and efficient defence mechanisms against 
these of attacks. This is essential  due to the fact that the detection and mitigation of these 
attacks remain challenging issues. They are stealthier and more sophisticated compared to 
network-layer DoS attacks resulting in flying under the radar of traditional network-layer-
based intrusion detection systems.  
Furthermore, by devising the proposed taxonomy, a number of key features  of 
application-layer DoS attacks is defined to characterise the variability of these  attacks. The 
defined features describe the general steps of an attack (i.e., reconnaissance and execution), 
the attack characteristics and the attack effect on the targeted  system. These features 
comprise a roadmap for researchers to navigate through the diversity of the application-
layer DoS attacks and thus form a foundation of the proposed taxonomy.  
As future work, we plan to define a set of proper metrics for the extracted features. The 
defined metrics will be essential for evaluating potential defence mechanisms against 
known application-layer DoS attacks. Moreover, the defined metrics can be used as 
parameters in the study of attacks that have not yet appeared but can be potential threats in 
            
  
            
  





the future. Finally, the set of the defined metrics can be used in the design and deployment 
of defence mechanisms against the new application-layer DoS attacks.  
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